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Another Look at the Collapse of Skyline Plaza at Bailey's
Crossroads, Virginia
Jeffrey Schellhammer'; Norbert J. Delatte, F.ASCE 2 ; and Paul A. Bosela, F.ASCE 3

Introduction

Description of the Structure

On March 2. 1973. the Skyline Plaza apartment bui lding in Bailey's
Crossrmlds. Virginia collapsed while under construction. The col
Illpsecxlcndcd vertically through thc building. from the241h 1100rl0
the ground, leaving an appearance of the structure as tWO different
high-rise buildings with a gap between them. The collapse tore a
18-m (60-ft) wide gap through the building a ll the way to thc ground.
At Ihc li me of the collapse. two pmctically identical RC towers had
already been built ( Kwninctzky 1991. p. 64). Fig. I shows an nerial

The 26-story apartment building was pan of a $200 million resi
dential project (Carper 1997. p. 243). The floor plan is shown in
Fig. 5. The building thllt collllpsed is on the left side of Fig. 5, with
a parking garage extending to the right. The 118- by 23-m (386- by
76-ft) building was to be built at a pace orone floor per week (De latte
2009. p. 145). Each floor was to be placed in four separate sections
with a construction joint in the middle. between sections two and
three.
The completed structure WllS to be 26-stories tllii. T he building
was to include the 26 stories. a penthouse, and a 4-story basement.
Each floor was to be 3 m (9 ft ) from top of slab to top of slab. and the
basement was to be a total of 14 m (40 ft) with the four levels varying
in height bcclluse of mechaniclli equipment. The first floor elevation
was to be the same as the roof of the parking garage. which WllS to be
a green. landscllped llrea. The building was designed to the 1963
edition of the ACI Building Code Requirements for Reinforced
Concrete ACI 318-63 (Leyendecker and Fallal 1977 . p. 5: ACI
1963).
Two different foundation types were used in the construction of
the complex. The apartment building used a 1.2-m (4-ft) thick mat
type foundation. whereas the parking gamge used columns on
footings. The column layout of the apartment bui ldi ng. shown in
Fig. 5. was the same throughout the structure. The size and strength
of concrete differed with respect to the heig ht of the structure. The
compressive strength of the normal weight concrete was to be 34.5
MPll (5,000 psi) for the colu mns from the foundation to the seventh
floor. 27.6 MPa (4.000 psi) from the seventh floor to the seventeenth
floor. and 20.7 MPa (3.000 psi) from the seventeenth floor to the top
of the structure. The floor slabs used sand.Jightweight concrete with
a compressive strength of 20.7 MPa (3.000 psi) (Leyendecker and
Fatta] 1977. pp. 5- 7).
Both structures used a flat-plate type of construction. According
to Wight and MagGregor (2002. p. 6). flat plates are "of uniform

phologmph of thc structure taken shortly before the colJupse. <II about
t I a.m. on Ihe same day. The collapse occurred at about 2:30 p.m.
(Leyendecker and Fallal 1977. p. 2). The collapsed structure is shown
in Figs. 2-4.
The Americllll Concrete Institute's (AC!) Forlllwork for COli·
creTe (Hurd 2005 . pp. 2-2- 2-3) cites this case as a "tragic example of
too-earl y shore removal." This case study reviews the available
published infonnation on the case to detemline what lessons can be
learned. The case is suitable for inclusion in variety of courses in the
civil engineering and construction curriculum.

Fig. 1. Aerial photograph of the structure shortly before the collapse
(courtesy of NIST)

Fig. 4. Close-up view of the collapsed structure (courtesy of NIST)

shear stresses produced from the respective ﬂoor dead and live loads,
without reinforcing beams.
Fig. 2. The collapsed structure (courtesy of NIST)

Collapse

Fig. 3. Another view of the collapsed structure (courtesy of NIST)

thickness throughout without drop panels or column capitals. . . Flat
plate ﬂoors are widely used in apartments because the underside of
the slab is ﬂat and hence can be used as the ceiling of the room below.
Of equal importance, the forming for a ﬂat plate is generally cheaper
than that for ﬂat slabs with drop panels or for one-way slab-and
beam ﬂoors.” This meant that the slab itself carried the bending and

Shortly after lunch, some workers observed slab deﬂections of ap
proximately 150–600 mm (6 in. to 2 ft) for both the 23rd ﬂoor slab
and the freshly placed 24th ﬂoor slab. The freshly placed section of
the 24th ﬂoor slab then fell onto the 23rd ﬂoor slab, starting a col
lapse that continued all the way to the foundation (Schlager 1994).
Schousboe (1976) described in detail the construction activities that
occurred on the day of collapse and the condition of the building and
the parking garage just before the event. The building’s collapse
removed the edge support from the parking garage, and falling debris
triggered the failure of the garage.
The collapse killed 14 workers and injured 34 (Carino et al. 1983,
p. 35). The area that collapsed is designated as area 3 in Fig. 1. This
area also contained a crane; as a result, there was a question as to
whether the crane fell and initiated the collapse, or if it just came
down with the rest of the building. Once the section of the apartment
building collapsed, the failure propagated horizontally through the
attached parking garage. Of the workers killed, 10 were in the tower
and four in the garage (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 2).
On March 3, 1973, the New York Times noted, “Six Killed as
a Crane Drops Through Virginia Building.” The article stated that,
“Six persons were killed, 34 injured and 14 were reported missing
today in the collapse of a partly completed high-rise apartment
building in this suburb of Washington DC.” This article was pub
lished the day after the collapse. The initial hypothesis was that the
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Fig. 5. Plan view of the Skyline Plaza Apartment Building and parking garage (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 6)

crane itself was the cause for the collapse. The article stated, “The
falling crane broke through the top ﬂoors, its weight carrying with it
layer after layer of concrete to the ground in a ‘domino effect,’
Lieutenant Diezel said. ‘It made a terrible impact, almost like

a bomb’.” The article also stated that the impact of the collapse
caused the adjoining parking garage to collapse, and that most of the
workers that were onsite were working on the garage. In conclusion,
the article states that, “there were more than 200 workers at the site

when the collapse occurred, at 2:30 p.m. Some 24 ﬂoors of the
building had already been completed, and the 10 bottom ﬂoors had
been faced with brick” (“Six killed” 1973).
The next day, another article was published in the New York
Times stating, “Building Wreckage Will be Dismantled.” This article
stated that the building “was sliced in two yesterday when a crane
broke through and crashed ﬂoor by ﬂoor to the ground in a mass of
broken concrete and twisted metal. Of 337 men working in the
building, ﬁve are known dead and 34 were injured.” (“Building
wreckage” 1973).

National Bureau of Standards Investigation
Shortly after the collapse, the Occupational Safety and Health Ad
ministration (OSHA) arrived on the site to investigate. On March 5,
OSHA requested technical assistance from the National Bureau of
Standards [NBS; now the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST)]. The investigators did not gain access to the
building until March 5th. This meant that the eastern part of the
structure had already been demolished, but the NBS report does not
indicate that this demolition or any of the rescue operations had any
effect on the investigation (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, pp. 2–7).
The NBS team was asked to answer three questions—the cause
of the accident, whether there had been violations of OSHA safety
standards, and if any violations contributed to the collapse. The NBS
investigators reviewed records from on-site inspections, OSHA case
records, structural, architectural, and shop drawings, and the results
of tests on concrete core samples (Carino et al. 1983, pp. 35–36).
At the time, NBS regularly carried out building failure inves
tigations when requested by another agency such as OSHA. “The
bureau limits its investigations to technical matters. It does not
attempt to trace the source of technical errors or assign blame. The
bureau sees these technical studies as compatible with its research,
particularly its development of building design criteria for use by the
voluntary code groups” (“Bureau’s failure” 1981).

Construction Process
Typical ﬂoors in the apartment building were placed in four sections
with an expected speed of one section per day. At such a rate, the
construction crew could ﬁnish one ﬂoor per week with 1 day left for
possible weather delays (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 7).
Although the previous pace of construction had been one ﬂoor
per week, near the end of February, the pace accelerated to almost
twice that rate. As a result, when the concrete was being placed for
the 24th ﬂoor, the 23rd ﬂoor slab was only 4 days old instead of
7 days old (Schousboe 1976; Schlager 1994).

Formwork and Shoring
The NBS team quickly determined that the condition of the formwork would be important for the investigation. The ACI Guide to
Formwork for Concrete (ACI 2004) provides the following deﬁ
nitions for form, formwork, reshores, and shores:
“form—a temporary structure or mold for the support of concrete
while it is setting and gaining sufﬁcient strength to be selfsupporting.
formwork—total system of support for freshly placed concrete,
including the mold or sheathing that contacts the concrete and all
supporting members, hardware, and necessary bracing.
reshores—shores placed snugly under a stripped concrete slab or
other structural member after the original forms and shores have

been removed from a large area, requiring the new slab or structural
member to deﬂect and support its own weight and existing con
struction loads to be applied before installation of the reshores.
shores—vertical or inclined support members designed to carry
the weight of the formwork, concrete, and construction loads
above.”
To determine whether premature removal of shoring or failure to
install reshoring had caused the collapse, it was necessary to de
termine what formwork was in place at that time. This proved dif
ﬁcult. Between the March 2nd collapse and the arrival of the NBS
team on site, additional reshoring was placed to stabilize some parts
of the building. Some of the workers’ statements about the status of
the shoring conﬂicted with each other. One worker who was in
stalling reshores on the 21st ﬂoor claimed to have heard formwork
and shoring removal on the 22nd ﬂoor at about 2 p.m. Careful
analysis of photographs taken right after the collapse showed that
while full shoring remained on the 23rd and 24th stories, it had nearly
all been removed from the 22nd story in sections 1 and 2, but
remained in section 4. The condition of the formwork in section 3
could not be observed because nearly all of this section had col
lapsed. The engineer’s structural drawings required 2 full stories of
shoring and 1 story of reshoring while a concrete slab was being cast.
The NBS team concluded that the estimated location of forms,
shores, and reshores at the time of the collapse was as shown in
Fig. 6, with all formwork removed on sections 1–3 of the 22nd ﬂoor
and little if any reshoring on that ﬂoor (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977,
pp. 18–31).
Some workers said that all of the shoring was removed on both
ﬂoors, some said that only some was removed, and others believed
that all was still in place at the time of collapse (Leyendecker and
Fattal 1977. p. 18). However, the statements of one worker gave the
investigators a good idea of the state of the forms at the time of the
collapse. Leyendecker and Fattal (1977, p. 31) reported “One
workman indicated that, at the time of the incident, he was placing
reshores in section 3 of the 21st story and that some reshores were
present when he started working. Prior to the incident, all the
reshores fell out (except those in the balcony areas). This is con
sistent with what would be likely to occur if the forms had been
removed in the story above.” If the shoring had been removed in the
22nd ﬂoor, the 22nd ﬂoor slab would have been relieved of its
previous loads. With less loading, the deﬂection would have de
creased in the slab, causing the reshores on the 21st ﬂoor to fall out.
The overall condition of the formwork was also evaluated. After
the collapse, much of the remaining lumber was found to be in poor
condition or out of plumb, and thus in violation of OSHA. Some of
the lateral bracing was not properly connected to the formwork
(Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, pp. 21–26).
Schlager (1994) noted that the OSHA regulations in effect at the
time required that for ﬂoor spans over (6.1 m) (20 ft), forms needed
to be left in place for at least 10 days of temperatures exceeding
10°C (50°F).

Concrete Strength and Strength Development
Results of standard ASTM C39 concrete cylinder tests showed ad
equate strength at 7 and 28 days. However, these were laboratory
tests, with cylinders stored at a controlled temperature. Particularly
in cold weather, laboratory tests do not correspond to the strength of
the concrete in place in a structure. OSHA regulations required ﬁeldcured cylinders, stored at the same temperature as the structure, to
verify the strength of the structure before removing shores and
formwork. As part of the investigation, 100-mm (4-in.) diameter
cores were obtained from the structure. These also showed that the

Fig. 6. Estimated location of forms and reshores at the time of the collapse (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 30)

quality of concrete delivered to the project was sufﬁcient to produce
adequate strength (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, pp. 57–59).
It is well known that cold weather delays gains in concrete
strength. The maturity method (ASTM 2011) can be used to account
for this effect. The calculation may be performed in terms of timetemperature factor (TTF) or equivalent age. To calculate the TTF
P
ð1Þ
MðtÞ ¼  ðTa 2 T0 ÞDt
where MðtÞ 5 time-temperature factor at age t, in degree-days or
degree-hours; Dt 5 a time interval, in days or hours; Ta 5 average
concrete temperature during the time interval Dt; and T0 5 datum
temperature, typically taken as –10°C (14°F) (ACI 2003).
To calculate equivalent age
te ¼

P

e

2Q

121
Ta Ts

Dt

ð2Þ

where te 5 equivalent age at speciﬁed temperature Ts , in days or
hours; Q 5 activation energy divided by the gas constant (kelvin),
often taken as 5,000 K for concrete made with ASTM Type I cement;
Ts 5 speciﬁed temperature, typically 296 K or 23°C (73°F), gen
erally the temperature of laboratory cured cylinders; and other
variables are as previously deﬁned (ACI 2003).
However, it was February, and the ambient temperature ranged
from –2 to 11°C (28–52°F). This meant two things. First, the
number of days when construction was suspended because of low
temperatures was usually at least 1 day per week, and secondly, it
would take more time for the concrete to gain its required strength.
For example, sections one, two, and three of the 21st ﬂoor were
placed on February 5th, 6th, and 7th, respectively. However, the
fourth section of the 21st ﬂoor was not placed until a week later on
February 13th.
Temperatures recorded at National Airport before the collapse
suggested that the average air temperature was 5.6°C for the 22nd

ﬂoor and 7°C for the 23rd ﬂoor (42 and 45°F, respectively)
(Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 60). The temperature history
is shown in Fig. 7. Concrete cured at (5.6°C) (42°F) for 1 week would
have a TTF 5 ð5:6 1 10Þ 3 7 5 109°C e days ½ð42 e 14Þ 3 7 5
196°F e days]. In contrast, concrete cured at the standard laboratory
temperature of 23°C (73°F) would have a TTF 5 ð23 1 10Þ 3
7 5 231°C e days ½ð73 e 14Þ 3 7 5 392°F e days]. In other words,
at 5.6°C (42°F), concrete takes about twice as long to gain strength
as at standard laboratory temperature.
In terms of equivalent age, 5.6°C (42°F) 5 279 K
te ¼

P

e25;000

1 2 1
279 296

7 ¼ 2:5

Although the two formulas give slightly different results, it is
reasonable to assume that at 7 days the concrete in a structure at an
average temperature of 5.6°C (42°F) would be roughly equivalent to
that of laboratory cylinders at 2-1/2 to 3-1/2 days.
The concrete contained calcium chloride accelerating admixture,
at a rate of 2% by weight of cement, to counteract low temperatures.
It is estimated that the strength of the 23rd ﬂoor slab concrete was
approximately 6.6–9.9 MPa (960–1,440 psi) (Carino et al. 1983).
Throughout the winter, however, construction of 23 ﬂoors had
proceeded without any evident problems. At some times, the two
ﬂoors supporting a freshly placed slab had a combined age of only
10 days of equivalent age when considering maturity (Schousboe
1976).

Structural Analysis
At the time of the collapse, three-dimensional elastic ﬁnite-element
(FE) analysis using computers was still a relatively new technology.
The NBS investigation team used FE analysis to evaluate the slab
stresses in the region where the collapse occurred, using beam and
plate elements. Stresses were compared with the provisions of ACI

Fig. 7. Temperature history (scale 0°F 5 218°C and 60°F 5 15.6°C) (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 63)

318–71 (ACI 1971). Three different cases were analyzed, with
different shoring and concrete conditions. Yield line analysis was
also used. The results showed that even with low-concrete strength,
a ﬂexural failure of the slab would be unlikely. However, under any
of the cases where shores had been removed, a punching shear
failure of the slab would probably occur. Once punching shear
occurred at any one column, the collapse would rapidly propagate as
other slab-column joints became overstressed. There was no in
dication that the crane was a contributing factor to the collapse
(Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, pp. 65–83).
It should also be noted that by the ACI code (ACI 1971), sandlightweight concrete has a 15% lower shear strength than con
ventional concrete for the same compressive strength. The most
critical locations for punching shear were found to be at columns 67,
68, 83, and 84 (Carino et al. 1983).

speciﬁcations requiring “in call cases, two ﬂoors shall be fully
shored.” (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 85). Another investigation
was carried out that agreed with the ﬁndings of the NBS team
(Schousboe 1976).
The NBS team also found other instances of failure to comply with
OSHA regulations. These included premature removal of 22nd story
shores and failure to use ﬁeld-cured concrete cylinders to ensure that
the concrete had achieved sufﬁcient strength before removing shores
and forms. The shoring did not have proper lateral bracing, and some of
it was out of plumb and damaged, although this probably did not con
tribute to the collapse. Inspection that should have noted the problems
was either not done or the corrections were not made. Some deviations
in the crane supported lengths were also found, but these probably had
no bearing on the incident (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, pp. 85–86).

Legal and Ethical Implications
Findings from the National Bureau
of Standards Investigation
The NBS team concluded that the most likely cause of the collapse
was a punching shear failure of the 23rd ﬂoor slab. The two factors
that contributed to this were premature removal of shores below the
23rd ﬂoor slab, and the low strength of the 23rd ﬂoor concrete in the
area supporting the weight of the 24th ﬂoor slab (Carino et al. 1983).
Construction did not adhere to the engineer’s requirements that were
shown in a note on the structural drawings, which were “slab being
poured to be shored for two ﬂoors and backpropped at center of span
each way and at center of bay on next ﬂoor down,” or the architect’s

The developer was ordered to temporarily halt construction, and
a subcontractor was ﬁned $300 for improperly shoring freshly
poured concrete. At the time, Battiata (1982) noted that company
ofﬁcials refused to discuss the incident.
A number of court cases resulted from this collapse. Most were
ﬁled within a year or two of the collapse. A criminal trial was the ﬁrst
to reach the courts. The vice president of the concrete ﬁrm was tried
for manslaughter, for ordering removal of the formwork. The de
fendant did not testify, and the case resulted in a hung jury; the jury
could not be sure that he had ordered removal of enough of the
formwork to cause collapse (Fairweather 1975).

The concrete subcontractor paid less than $20,000 in ﬁnes, de
spite the fact that the collapse had caused $8 to $10 million in
damages, in addition to the deaths and injuries (Schlager 1994).
Next, the Commonwealth of Virginia’s Workmen’s Compen
sation legislation provided beneﬁts to the injured and the survivors of
those killed. As in many states, the beneﬁts were far from adequate.
For example, a quadriplegic might get as little as $85 a month for life
(Fairweather 1975).
The Worker’s Compensation legislation provided immunity to
subcontractors and in most cases, the general contractor, so they could
not be sued. However, design professionals such as architects and
engineers were not protected (Fairweather 1975).
Therefore, one of the injured construction workers later sued the
architect and engineer for $500,000. The suit was successful, and the
plaintiff was awarded the $500,000 at the expense of the engineer
and architect. The outcome caused considerable concern to the
architectural and engineering professional societies (Franklin 1975).
The judge later found the amount excessive and cut it in half
(Fairweather 1975).
The designers were blamed for not visiting the project site to
inspect the construction, despite the fact that it was not part of their
scope of work (Schlager 1994; Carper and Feld 1997). As Carper
(2001) noted, “The architect and engineer were thus held responsible
for the collapse, even though their explicit speciﬁcations for re
quired shoring were not being implemented at the site.”
Kaminetzky (1991, p. 67) noted that the “collapse raised the issue
of the extent of the engineer of record’s responsibility for the success
and safety of formwork design and inspection. While the engineer’s
contract speciﬁcally stated that he had no responsibility for ﬁeld
inspection, nevertheless a jury found him negligent. This was so
because the pertinent code required that ‘a competent architect or
engineer’ must provide supervision ‘where requested by the building
ofﬁcial’.” Often, owners are not willing to pay engineers for the site
visits. Some jurisdictions now require owners to pay for inspection.

Educational Aspects
Schlager (1994) believed that this collapse called attention to some
endemic problems of the U.S. construction industry. The ﬁrst is that
project contractors and subcontractors are responsible for temporary
works, such as formwork and shoring, although they may not know
much about construction loading or structural design. The project
structural engineers, who may have that knowledge, are normally
not involved in the design of temporary works. A second is that the
ﬁeld implementation of a design depends on construction quality
control, and the degree of care in inspection can vary from project to
project. The third is that excessive speed of construction can be
dangerous. The Portland Cement Association (PCA) and the ACI
both used this case to improve building codes and structural safety.
Kaminetzky (1991, p. 67) cited six lessons from this case:
•
The contractor should be responsible for preparing formwork
drawings, including shores and reshores;
•
The contractor should prepare a detailed concrete testing plan for
stripping forms, including cylinder tests;
•
Inspectors and other quality control agencies should verify that
the contractor performs the previous two items;
•
The Engineer of Record (EOR) should make sure he/she provides
the contractor with all necessary design load data and other unique
project information;
•
Uncontrolled acceleration of formwork removal may cause a
total or partial collapse; and
•
Continuous top and bottom slab reinforcement is necessary around
the columns. Continuous reinforcement provides overall ductility.

If the contractor uses cylinder tests to determine when to strip
forms during cold weather, the cylinders should be stored at the same
ambient temperature as the structure. This will prevent over
estimation of the in-place concrete strength.
This case study is of relevance to a number of engineering
courses. For a course in concrete materials, it illustrates how the
strength gain of concrete is hampered in cold weather. Courses in
construction can also use this collapse to indicate the importance of
structural integrity of formwork and of control of shore removal and
reshoring.

Conclusion
“The NBS investigation concluded that the probable cause of
the collapse was a punching shear failure of the 23rd ﬂoor. . . The
premature removal of forms supporting the 23rd story slab when the
concrete of that slab had a relatively low strength produced shear
stresses in excess of the concrete capacity at the time of the
incident. . . Most of the eyewitness reports indicated deﬂection in the
23rd and 24th story slabs [varying from 6 in. to 2 ft (152 mm to
0.6 m)] which increased over a 15 or 20 min time period before
failure. . . The loss of support from any one of these columns led to
overstressing of the slab around the remaining columns and the
failure propagated through the 23rd ﬂoor until a stable conﬁguration
remained. The accumulation and impact of falling debris from the
collapsing 23rd and 24th ﬂoors overloaded the 22nd ﬂoor slab and
induced the progressive collapse of successive ﬂoors down to the
ground” (Carino et al. 1983, p. 41).
Schousboe (1976) concluded that “The errors committed on the
Skyline Project at Bailey’s Crossroads have all been previously
encountered in the history of construction failures. The structure was
nothing out of the ordinary; this type of building had been suc
cessfully erected many times all over this country. The failure was
conceived with a human decision and order to remove formwork
without a well-founded estimate of the strength attained by the
concrete, and was born when the order was carried out.”
Following this incident, Fairfax County, Virginia, was one of the
ﬁrst jurisdictions to adopt a formal critical structures program. These
programs required preconstruction conferences to deﬁne re
sponsibilities before work begins. The determination of critical
structures is based on type of construction, building type, and height,
such as posttensioned buildings or structural steel buildings over
3 stories in height (“Inspection programs” 1987).
Despite the fact that this collapse occurred nearly four decades
ago, the lessons learned are still relevant. Formwork collapses still
occur, although usually on a smaller scale. Safe control of concrete
construction still requires a knowledge of concrete strength gain, and
of proper formwork design and proper control of shoring removal
and reshoring operations.
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